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Introduction
Policymakers all over the world increasingly respond to public outrage about how little taxes are payed by multinational corporations (MNCs) like Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft or Starbucks. Recent reports about substantial tax avoidance by these firms as well as tight public budgets after the financial crisis have provoked governments to take drastic measures to prevent avoidance activities.
1 This government action is supported by the OECD report on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) published in 2013, in which the OECD raises concerns about corporate tax revenue losses, recognizing that profit shifting by MNCs is "a pressing and current issue for a number of jurisdictions" (OECD, 2013a, p.5).
The OECD identifies intra-group financial transactions as one of the main strategies used by MNCs to save taxes. In particular, there is a great deal of evidence that MNCs thinly capitalize foreign entities operating in high-tax countries by excessively using debt financing there. This debt is often provided through lending entities facing low or even zero taxes via an internal capital market (see Egger et al., 2014) . The implication is that tax base (taxable profit) is shifted out of high-tax countries through interest payments across borders. The BEPS report recommends to "limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments" (OECD, 2013b, Action 4, p.17).
As a matter of fact, measures to restrict interest deductions associated with excessive debt financing and profit shifting have been implemented for some time by many countries. For example, 61 out of 172 analyzed countries have been using so-called thin-capitalization rules (TCRs) in 2012 (see Merlo and Wamser, 2014) . From 1996 until 2012, 37 countries have introduced a TCR, only 4 countries abolished their TCRs.
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A small but growing literature in economics confirms the effectiveness of TCRs in removing tax-incentives related to debt financing. Buettner et al. (2012) as well as Blouin et al. (2014) find that affiliates of MNCs no longer respond to tax incentives if TCRs are introduced or made stricter. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) , Overesch and Wamser (2010) , as well as Wamser (2014) analyze a reform of the German TCR and find that foreign firms adjusted their capital structures after stricter rules have been introduced. Thus, this literature suggests that TCRs are effective and countries may use them as a policy instrument to restrict tax planning of MNCs.
Another way of interpreting the results of this literature is that new or stricter TCRs lead to a broader tax base. To the extent that a broader tax base leads to higher effective tax payments, a straightforward prediction is that stricter TCRs reduce real investment activity of firms, ceteris paribus. However, the question of how TCRs are related to real investment activities of MNCs has been widely neglected in the literature. One exemption is the paper by Buettner et al. (2014) , in which the intensive margin of foreign activity (in terms of foreign affiliates investments in fixed assets) is analyzed.
That paper confirms that TCRs exert negative effects on investments, particularly in countries with relatively high taxes.
Our paper contributes to this literature in several ways. First, we assess the impact of TCRs on the extensive margin of foreign activity (location choice). Second, we use new data on TCRs and all worldwide (first) location choices of German MNCs over a time span of 11 years. Third, we calculate realistic own-and cross-tax as well as TCR elasticities by using a mixed logit (or random coefficient) model. The latter allows for heterogeneity in the responsiveness of firms to corporate tax incentives. Fourth, we provide numerous interesting policy results, including (i) an assessment of the relative importance of tax base vs. tax rate effects; (ii) estimates on real world policy options for unilateral measures against profit shifting; (iii) an assessment of the implications of a coordination in policies against profit shifting.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, lower corporate taxes and laxer
TCRs exert positive effects on the probability to choose a given location to set up the first foreign affiliate. For example, a 1% lower tax in the UK would lead to an increase of about 0.66% in the probability to choose the UK as a host country for the first foreign affiliate. Second, we find that policies of one country exert significant externalities on other countries. For example, a 1% more lenient TCR in France would reduce the probability to locate in Argentina by -0.039%. Note that these externalities on other countries are heterogeneous across countries. This implies not only that own optimal policies differ, but also that coordinated action would produce winners and losers. Our estimations suggest that the main losers of a coordinated policy would be Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and Ireland. The main winners of such a policy would be France, the UK, and the US.
Finally, we provide estimates on the relative importance of tax rate vs. tax base effects. We illustrate this using the example of the US and its policy options. Starting from actual values of tax and TCR policy, we demonstrate that lowering the tax rate is by far the more effective instrument for the US to attract investment. For the US, our estimates imply that a 10 percentage point stricter TCR needs to be matched by a 2.3 percentage point lower corporate tax rate in order to keep the location attractiveness unchanged.
We believe that our paper not only contributes to the discussion about how to prevent profit shifting of MNCs but also to a general literature on the impact of tax and taxbase effects and their relative importance. We provide a number of new and instructive results supporting theoretical work. Given the externalities created by tax policy, our findings suggest that under strategic interaction, tax rates are set too low and TCRs are set too lenient. Coordinated measures against profit shifting by implementing a uniform TCR would therefore be clearly welfare increasing (see Haufler and Runkel, 2012) . Given our estimates, it also seems that coordination would come at a lower cost than introducing a system of formula apportionment -where multinational profits are consolidated and apportioned to individual entities according to a formula reflecting the MNC's real activity -as suggested by previous work (e.g., European Commission, 2011; Avi-Yonah et al., 2009; Hines, 2010 , for a survey) or a system providing an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) (e.g., Mirrlees, 2011) . While it is clear that the latter two systems abolish incentives to use excessive debt financing related to profit shifting, the costs of implementing such systems appear to be rather high, given high administration and compliance costs, and possible distortions at other margins.
In comparison, we believe that a coordination of policy measures such as TCRs and the associated welfare benefits are relatively easy to achieve.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related literature. Section 3 describes how TCRs work and and in Section 4 we discuss how TCRs affect location choices of MNCs. Sections 5 and 6 describe the estimation strategy and our dataset. The results and numerous policy experiments and quantifications are reported in Sections 7 and 8. Section 9 discusses policy implications and concludes.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to a growing number of empirical papers providing evidence on profit shifting by MNCs. For example, Swenson (2001) , Clausing (2003) , and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) show that firms distort intra-firm transfer prices in a way that is consistent with tax differentials. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) , Mintz and Weichrieder (2010) , Huizinga et al. (2008) , Møen et al. (2011) , Buettner and Wamser (2013) , Wamser (2010, 2014) , and Egger et al. (2014) present evidence that corporate taxes determine capital structure choices of affiliates of MNCs, which is in line with debt and profit shifting behavior (see also Heckemeyer et al., 2013 , for a meta-study). Second, beside the contributions on the impact of TCRs (see above), recent papers confirm that legislations enacted by European countries to limit the abusive use of transfer pricing are effective (Lohse and Riedel, 2013; Beer and Loeprick, 2013) . There is also evidence that controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation has an impact on how MNCs allocate passive assets across countries (Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012) . Our paper contributes to this literature by assessing the impact of TCRs on the location of real corporate activity of multinational firms. To the best of our knowledge, this link has so far largely been ignored.
Our paper is also related to prior work on the impact of corporate taxation on the location decision of MNCs. The large majority of papers on corporate taxation and firm activity analyse corporate tax rate effects on marginal investment decisions (see, e.g. de Mooji and Ederveen, 2003, and Heckemeyer and Feld, 2011) . The impact of corporate taxes on location choice is, on the contrary, studied by a relatively small number of papers. The seminal paper by Devereux and Griffith (1998) provides evidence that corporate taxation deters the location of subsidiaries of MNCs. Barrios et al. (2012) confirm this finding using rich data on European MNCs. In line with this evidence, our estimates suggest a negative impact of corporate taxes on multinational location decisions and, additionally indicate a negative impact of stricter anti-avoidance rules.
Moreover, contrary to most prior work, our analysis accounts for the worldwide location decision of multinational firms and does not restrict the perspective to a limited set of countries in the OECD, Europe or North America.
Finally, a number of recent papers discuss to what extent the questions raised in the OECD BEPS report require action and how this action should look like. For example, Dharmapala (2014) argues that policy measures to prevent income shifting can not be implemented without having reliable estimates on the magnitude thereof. Hebous and Weichenrieder (2014) reason that measures to prevent profit shifting have been implemented successfully by many countries, but that it is less clear to what extent partial harmonization and coordination of these measures leads to beneficial results, given that tax rates are still set at the national level. Our paper contributes to the policy discussion by quantifying the externalities of uncoordinated anti-avoidance policies, in terms of the attractiveness of a location for real investment. We also quantify the trade-off between base-broadening and tax-cutting reforms.
Thin capitalization rules
As described in the introductory section, MNCs have an incentive to distort the financial structure of their operations in order to shift income from high-tax to low-tax entities. This is achieved by injecting equity capital in a low-tax affiliate which then lends to related entities located in high-tax countries. As interest payments for the intra-firm borrowing are deductible from the corporate tax base, the associated income is stripped out of the high-tax country and taxed at a low or zero rate at the low-tax or tax-haven entity.
The purpose of thin capitalization rules is to limit the deductibility of interest payments on intra-firm loans from the corporate tax base, thereby reducing the described debt-shifting incentives. Most countries' tax legislations lay down specific safe haven or safe harbor debt-equity relations until which interest deduction is not restricted.
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Once a firm's debt-to-equity ratio is in excess of such a safe haven ratio, interest is no longer tax-deductible and fully taxed. An example may help to see this. For instance, interest costs of a foreign affiliate located in Canada are fully deductible only if its debt is below 1.5 times its equity. However, suppose a foreign affiliate is financed by a loan of 10 million CAD and by 5 million equity. Then, only 75% of the interest expenses are deductible as the loan exceeds 1.5 × equity by 2.5 million CAD (10 − 1.5 × 5).
Denoting ω as the amount of debt and ϑ as the amount of equity, we can define a safe 3 Ruf and Schindler (2012) as well as Dourado and de la Feria (2008) provide surveys on TCRs. They distinguish between different types of TCRs: some countries have implemented specific, others have implemented non-specific TCRs. For reasons of data availability and measurability, we focus on specific TCRs and the so-called fixed debt-to-equity approach. More details on TCRs, their design and application, as well as a discussion of the recent trend of replacing the fixed debt-to-equity approach by using earnings stripping rules (ESRs) can be found in Merlo and Wamser (2014) .
haven threshold Θ as
Using this definition, the Canadian safe haven threshold (SHT ) amounts to Θ CAN = 1.5 1.5+1 = 0.6. Equation (1) Our analysis is based on TCR information for a sample of 172 countries (see Merlo and Wamser, 2014) . In our data, the average SHT conditional on Θ < 1 equals 0.73.
Hence, the Canadian SHT is stricter than the average SHT in our data (conditional on 
The effect of TCRs on location choices
As mentioned in Section 2, corporate taxation is an important determinant of MNCs location choices. Previous work focused on the effect of profit tax rates on the choice of location. As Devereux and Griffith (1998) show, a firm facing a given number of possible locations will base its location decision on the comparison of after-tax profits arising at each location. The effective average tax rate (total tax payments relative to gross profits) determines the location choice through its effect on average costs.
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Since TCRs directly determine the effective average tax rate, we expect them to have an effect on location choices. Denoting gross profits by G, the volume of debt financing by D, the statutory tax by τ , and debt interest by ι we obtain a simple representation of an average effective tax as
τ e measures the proportion of total profit taken in tax and, in line with the discussion above, a higher τ e reduces ceteris paribus after-tax profits at a given location and thus makes that location less likely to be chosen over other locations. The relevant component for understanding the effect of a TCR on τ e is the fraction of deductible interest expenses θ, θ ∈ [0, 1]. This fraction is always 1 if Θ equals 1 and interest deduction is not restricted. If Θ < 1, the parameter θ may take any value between 0 and 1. A stricter rule (a lower Θ) implies a lower fraction of deductible interest expenses θ. Since ∂τ e ∂θ < 0, a stricter TCR implies a higher effective tax rate. This leads us to the following prediction:
Hypothesis: A laxer TCR (a higher Θ) implemented by a given country reduces the average tax burden faced by MNCs at that country and increases the probability that firms choose that country as host location.
Econometric approach
We examine the impact of TCRs on MNCs' location decisions using a discrete location choice model, where each choice yields a potential (latent) payoff. Suppose a firm i is concerned with choosing one of J potential locations (countries) to set up its first foreign affiliate. Each of the j = 1, ..., J locations is associated with a latent profit π * ij and the actual choice of a location C i ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} is based on the maximum
. We postulate potential profits to depend on observable and unobservable firm and country characteristics as follows:
where Θ j is the safe-haven threshold in country j as defined in Section 3, τ j is the statutory corporate tax rate in country j, x ij is a 1 × K vector of country-and country-firm specific characteristics, and ij is a disturbance term. Note that variables in (2) do not bear a time index t, although we measure all variables in the year of each firm's first location choice. The parameters γ and those in the vector β are fixed population parameters to be estimated. The parameter on the corporate tax rate α i is indexed by i as it is defined as a firm-specific random coefficient and assumed to be normally distributed with parameters a and σ, which are to be estimated. Assuming
and ij ∼ iid extreme value yields the mixed (or random parameters) logit model.
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Specifying the coefficient α i on the corporate tax rate as random directly relates to the expectation of a large heterogeneity across firms in tax avoidance activities (de-pending on firm characteristics, products sold, access to finance, etc.), which suggests heterogeneity in tax elasticities.
Alternatively, it is useful to think of α i τ j as error components which, together with ij , represent the stochastic part of π * ij . This stochastic part η ij = α i τ j + ij is allowed to be correlated across alternatives. Under the assumption of a zero error component, the unobserved proportion of profits for one alternative is not correlated with the unobserved proportion of profits for another alternative.
8 By allowing for correlation in profits over alternatives m and n, we have
τ im W τ in , with W being the covariance of α i (see Train, 2009 ).
One of the central issues about (2) is specifying the variables that induce correlation among alternatives. One way to proceed is to think about the different determinants of location choice and why they might induce such correlation. It seems natural to consider the tax rate as a variable that causes such correlation as differences in taxes and tax policy across countries induce unobservable tax avoidance activities affecting π * ij through different forms of ij-specific tax planning or income shifting. Another interpretation in view of the theoretical tax competition literature is that tax policy is used by one country to attract mobile capital at the expense of other countries. For the empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to the location choice of the first foreign affiliate. For each firm in the dataset, we observe the country of location of their first foreign affiliate and the year in which it is set up. In the location choice model the firm's choice set consists of all J countries in which we observe first locations.
The dependent variable indicating each firm's choice is a binary variable c ij defined for all firm-i and country-j combinations. c ij equals one if firm i locates its first foreign affiliate in country j, i.e. c ij = 1, and zero otherwise (i.e. for all other possible J − 1 locations). Since firms establish their first foreign affiliate in different years, the choice set of each firm corresponds to the given set of countries, and the respective 10 All German firms and households which hold 10 percent or more of the shares or voting rights in a foreign enterprise with a balance-sheet total of more than 3 million euros are required by law to report balance-sheet information to Deutsche Bundesbank. Indirect participating interests had to be reported whenever foreign affiliates held 10 percent or more of the shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises until the end of year 2006. Thereafter, indirect participating interests had and have to be reported whenever foreign affiliates held more than 50 percent or more of the shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises with a balance-sheet total of more than 3 million euros. The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation. For details and a documentation of MiDi, see Lipponer (2009 As outlined above, location choice is determined by all variables that determine π * ij .
Beside tax determinants, our empirical analysis uses a very rich set of control variables which have been identified in previous studies as determinants of corporate location decisions.
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Our explanatory variables of interest are a country's safe-haven threshold, SHT (Θ in Eq. 2), and statutory corporate tax rate, T AX (τ ). Additionally, we include the following variables. The log of a country's GDP, log(GDP ), is included to capture local market size and demand conditions. Ceteris paribus, we expect that the location choice probability is positively related to this variable. Moreover, we include the log of GDP per capita, log(GDP P C), as a proxy for a country's labor productivity. As far as log(GDP P C) is positively related to purchasing power and the foreign entity is part of a horizontal FDI strategy, we would expect a positive impact of this variable.
If, on the other hand, the foreign entity is part of a vertically integrated firm and the MNC produces intermediate goods in low wage countries, a higher GDP per capita may be associated with higher average wages, which may lead to a lower probability to choose a location. Gross domestic product growth in country j, GDP growth, may be considered as a general measure for the economic attractiveness of a location. We furthermore include the variable DCP S to measure domestic credits provided to the private sector in a country relative to a country's GDP. We expect that DCP S is positively correlated with the quality of a country's financial market. Thus, higher values of DCP S are expected to make host countries more attractive. In addition, we include the log capital-labor ratio of host country j, KLRAT IO. This variable should reflect relative factor endowments of countries. To capture fixed investment cost we include COST BS, which measures costs of business start-up procedures (in % of GNI per capita) in a potential host country. The cost of starting a business is clearly an entry cost factor for MNCs (irrespective of whether FDI is vertical or horizontal), so its impact is expected to be negative.
Another relevant country characteristic is market j's inflation rate, IN F LR. The variables CORRU P T ION (freedom from corruption) and P RIGHT S (property rights) measure institutional quality. They can take values between 0 and 100, higher values referring to less corruption and better property rights in a host country. As foreign locations are more attractive for MNCs if they are more integrated in terms of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs), we condition on the existing treaty network of host countries by including BIT and DT T . BIT refers to the aggregate number of BITs, and DT T refers to the aggregate number of DTTs concluded by host country j with all other countries.
Using information from MiDi, we calculate the variable log(T ASSET S) as the sum of total assets of German MNCs in country j in the year before a new investment is established. The idea is to include a variable that measures the general attractiveness of foreign markets for German investors. Note that this variable refers to the aggregate of German FDI in the period before firm i enters a market, but all other explanatory variables are measured in the years a new foreign entity is set up.
Our analysis also accounts for control variables that reflect distance between host locations and the parent country Germany. On the one hand, these measures relate to geographical distance: log(DIST AN CE) is the log of the distance (in kilometers)
between the most populated cities between Germany and a host country; CON T IG is an indicator variables which equals one if Germany and a potential host country share a common border, and zero else. On the other hand, we include measures that relate to cultural closeness: COLON Y is equal to one if the potential host country is a former colony of Germany, and zero otherwise; COM LAN G is equal to one if Germany and the foreign country j share a common language. Mean values, standard deviations, definitions and data sources are summarized in Table 1 . Table 2 presents our preferred specification of the location choice model. 13 In addition to the variables listed in the previous section, the specification shown in Table 2 additionally includes interactions of the non-tax (fixed) determinants with the salesto-total-asset ratio (SAT A) of the parent. The estimated mean of T AX is significant at 1% and negative. The estimated standard deviation is significant and suggests that there is quite some heterogeneity in how tax rates affect location choices of MNCs.
Estimation results
Our central result is the finding of a positive and significant coefficient for SHR.
Hence, a laxer TCR (an increase in the safe haven ratio) leads to a higher probability that a country is chosen as first location. We will provide a quantification and interpretation of this result in the next sections.
The estimated coefficients on the other controls are usually in line with what we expect and can be summarized as follows. First, closer countries (in terms of distance, direct neighborhood, but also in terms of historic ties and language) are chosen with a higher probability than ones farther away. Second, higher FDI by German firms in the period before market entry is positively related to location probabilities. Third, the positive coefficient on DCP S and the negative estimate on SAT A × DSP S suggests that, while an underdeveloped financial market deters foreign affiliate location, the effect is less severe for larger MNCs which can arguably rely on an internal capital 13 We have tested a number of different specifications, including ones that define SHR (Θ) as a random variable. Some of the additional robustness estimates are presented below. We have also estimated conditional logit models (under the unfavorable IIA assumption). The results are very robust to this. However, a conditional logit does not allow for calculating meaningful substitution elasticities.
market. Fourth, we cannot find a statistically significant effect for BIT , DT T , IN F LR, and COST BS.
Tables 3 and 4 present alternative specifications of our location choice model. In Table   3 we test whether the omission of the firm-country interactions makes a big difference for the estimated coefficients of T AX and SHT . The results show that the estimates are very similar compared to the specifications using the additional interactions. In Table 4 we also define the safe haven ratio as random. However, the estimates suggest that there is no additional heterogeneity in the responses of firms as the standard deviation of SHT is insignificant. Conditional on T AX, this seems very plausible as the differences in taxes across countries, rather than cross-country variation in SHT per se, induce firms to optimize over intra-firm trade or financing. Taken all results together, it appears that the coefficients on SHT are precisely estimated as comparing it across different specifications shows that it hardly differs: .437 in Table 2 , .433 in Table 3 , and .430 in Table 4 .
Estimated location probabilities
Given the estimated coefficients of our preferred specification (Table 2) we calculate the probability of a firm choosing a given country to locate its first foreign affiliate.
The mixed logit model probability of firm i choosing location j is
where 
is the probability conditional on the unobserved firm-specific parameter α i . The unconditional probability P ij is obtained integrating L ij (α i ) over all possible values of α i .
14 Table 5 reports the estimated base location probabilities for the 80 countries included in our sample. These estimates vary from 0.126 for the US to values close to zero for Guyana, Jordan, Nicaragua, or Qatar. Note that these base probabilities are important not only when calculating elasticities but also when expressing our findings in terms of number of new affiliates below.
Own-and cross-SHT − and T AX−elasticities
The mixed logit model allows the calculation of interesting substitution patterns, i.e the own-and cross-country effect of a change in the safe-haven threshold of any given country on the location probabilities. The percentage change in the probability for alternative given the percentage change in Θ of jurisdiction j is given by
where the change in the probability depends on the correlation between L i (α) and
Tables 6 and 7 present own-and cross-elasticities for a selected number of countries.
In these tables, the entries on the main diagonal refer to the estimated own-elasticities.
For example, a 1-percent higher SHT (a 1-percent laxer safe haven threshold Θ) in
Brazil increases the probability to choose Brazil as a location to set up the first affiliate by 0.4238%. A 1-percent more lenient SHT in Ireland is associated with a somewhat lower elasticity of 0.2142. The entries off the main diagonal refer to cross-elasticities of a 1-percent change in the SHT of a country in a column on a country in a row. Table 6 shows that these cross-elasticities are not only estimated to be heterogeneous across countries changing their SHT s (across columns) but also across countries facing externalities exerted by other countries (in rows). For example, a 1-percent more lenient SHT in the US leads to large negative responses in Argentina, Canada, Japan, and
Norway. On the other hand, we estimate the smallest (the least negative) elasticity for Russia. The differences in estimated cross-elasticities may reflect differences or similarities in factor endowments or closeness in terms of language, culture, or distance (for Canada). It is also interesting to notice that there is no clear regularity with respect to how countries are recipients of shocks. For example, for a given country (in a given row), whether or not the impact on this country is big or not (compare columns for a given line), is highly dependent on which country is changing its policy. Table 7 presents own-and cross-elasticities for changes in the tax variable. 15 On average, we find larger elasticities compared to changes in the SHT . For example, a 1-percent lower tax in Canada would lead to a 0.7448% higher probability to locate a new entity there. The cross-tax-elasticities are also larger and highly heterogeneous. It is interesting to interpret these estimates in the light of the SHT elasticities. For example, we find that a change in the tax in the US leads to a huge impact on the probability to locate in Ireland (a cross-elasticity of −0.1317), while the estimated SHT -crosselasticity was rather modest. The reason for this finding may be that the tax burden of foreign affiliates in Ireland is not very high, so restrictions on debt financing do not bite. On the other hand, when other countries benefit from cutting taxes, this comes at the expense of Ireland whose attractiveness as a low-tax country is relatively reduced.
This is confirmed when focusing on the row IRL and comparing cross-responses across columns: the negative effect on Ireland is usually one of the largest.
We can finally interpret Tables 6 and 7 in light of the theoretical literature. Tax competition models with strategic interaction usually predict that increasing its own tax rate leads to an outflow of capital. A higher safe haven ratio (a more lenient TCR)
would imply an inflow of capital. In this sense, higher taxes exert positive externalities on other countries, while a higher safe haven ratio exerts a negative externality on other countries. Hence, on average, taxes are too low and TCRs are too lax as countries do not consider these externalities. implications for the 79 other countries included in our dataset are presented in Table   8 . Note that countries are sorted in alphabetical order according to their country codes.
The estimates suggest that this policy comes mainly at the cost of France, the UK, and Poland.
Uncoordinated tax rate and tax base policy
Over the last 30 years, corporate tax laws in many countries have seen tax-cutting and base-broadening reforms. Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002) show that these reforms had the effect that, on average, effective tax rates remained relatively stable.
Concluding from this that the reforms did not change the attractiveness of a location for real investment assumes that the marginal impact of tax and tax-base effects are of similar magnitude. In Table 9 we demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. The table presents some calculations on the tax rate cut that would be necessary in order to keep the location probability constant if the tax base was broadened by implementing a 10 percentage point stricter SHT . For the selection of countries from above, the numbers in Table 9 represent percentage point reductions in the tax rate. For example, Singapore would need to cut its tax by 1.44 percentage points if it reduced its SHT by 10 percentage points in order to hold the number of new entities constant. Hence, the table provides information about the relative importance of tax base vs. tax rate effects. It demonstrates that Ireland could easily make its TCR stricter without a large need to cut its tax rate. On the other hand, countries like Japan, Spain, or the US would need cut taxes by more than 2 percentage point in order to keep the number of new foreign affiliates (additional inward FDI at the extensive margin) constant. 
Coordinated policy action
Our empirical approach also allows us to determine winners and losers of a coordinated policy experiment. Suppose all countries took a coordinated action and set Θ equal to 0.5. This would imply that interest deduction for any amount of debt exceeding equity financing would be denied. A value of Θ = 0.5 refers to the strictest rules we have in our data, but a number of countries use ones that are nearly as strict.
The results of this experiment are summarized in winner is the US, where we find a substantial increase equal to 0.0097. Given a base probability of about 0.1260, this corresponds to an increase in the probability of about 7.7%. 
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of TCRs on the location of multinational firms' foreign affiliates. Using unique data on the worldwide activities and particularly on the first new foreign affiliates of German MNCs, we find that TCRs have a significant impact on location decisions of MNCs. Although the impact of TCRs is statistically as well as economically relevant, we can show that taxes are the more effective policy instrument. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is not only the first to examine the impact of TCRs on the extensive margin of foreign investment activity, it is also the first that provides actual estimates for the relative importance of tax rate and tax-base effects in this context. We believe that this is a central contribution to the corporate tax literature, as finding out about the quantitative (and relative) effectiveness of policy instruments is crucial for the design of tax policy.
Our results imply that policymakers should be aware of two things. First, imposing restrictions on profit shifting has implications for real investment activity: unilateral measures to "limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments"
(OECD, 2013b, Action 4, p.17) certainly come at the cost of losing real investments.
Second, policymakers should focus on organizing coordinated policy action when imposing TCRs. Our analysis suggests that this is welfare improving.
